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JUSTICE IN THE TIME OF TERROR
Sharon L. Davies*
DEFENDING MOHAMMAD: JUSTICE ON TRIAL. By Robert
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2003. Pp. xi, 183. $22.95.

E.

Precht.

On my drive into work recently I found myself behind a Ford
pickup truck and noticed its bumper sticker: "When the going gets
tough, I get a machine gun." Not a doctor. Not a counselor or
mediator. Not a shelter for cover. Not the wisdom of a favored advisor
or a proven friend. But a machine gun. How odd, I thought, to prefer a
weapon incapable of identifying with any precision, any careful
thought, where the enemy of the wielder of it might actually be
hidden. A weapon as apt to injure non-targets as targets. A weapon
mindless of its unintended consequences, and one that exhibits no
inkling that such acts of aggression, whether capable of justification or
not, are more likely to be met with hatred and more violence than
concessions of desert and a laying down of arms. How odd, and yet
how disturbingly familiar.
I wondered about the thought processes that might have led the
driver of the truck to place such a sentiment on his bumper for all the
world to see. What emotion, what belief might lead a person to
conclude that, out of all the options available, a machine gun was the
right choice to deal with goings tough? And then I had it: Fear.
To someone fearful of being seriously injured or perhaps even
killed by another, I supposed, a machine gun could appear to be a
perfectly reasonable weapon of choice. Perhaps especially if the other
was a stranger, with unfamiliar ways, whose very lack of familiarity, of
sameness, seemed to make him unpredictable, threatening, worthy of
suspicion and distrust. Even more so if there were many such "others,"
who by their very numbers became an even greater threat, perhaps
particularly if they lurked in places unknown, amidst innocents, to
make their detection all the more difficult - and necessary. In the
mind of the machine gun wielder, such a voluminous and elusive prey
might warrant the choice of this particular firearm.

* John C. Elam/Vorys Sater Designated Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law at the
Ohio State University; J.D., 1987, Columbia University School of Law; B.A., 1984,
University of Massachusetts at Amherst. - Ed. I would like to thank Professors Yale
Kamisar, Alan C. Michaels and Marc Spindelman for taking the time to read an earlier draft
of this Review and sharing with me their thoughts.
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If so, why then not a machine gun? Certainly such a weapon would
intimidate most would-be transgressors. Might not that deterrence
value by itself provide sufficient justification for choosing it rather
than some other less threatening approach? And if it was used, its
impressive fire power would certainly be more likely to bring down its
intended foes than would a weapon demanding a more deliberate aim,
a more precise calculation of who was and who was not sufficiently
threatening to deserve to be a target. True, it might ensnare some
innocents as well, but the gravity and imminence of some threats
justify the incursion of some unwanted costs.
The problem with this instinct, of course, is that history warns that,
for all our strengths and talents, we may not be particularly skilled at
assessing the gravity of threats and telling those who present real
threats from those who don't. This is especially true in moments of
national crisis and heightened public insecurity. Indeed, fear has been
at the heart of most of history's misjudgments. It was fear that
convinced so many in the 1940s, including the President,1 the Justice
Department,2

and

the

nation's

highest

court,3

that

the

forced

relocation of Japanese Americans into camps was a good and
constitutionally defensible idea. We have since rethought the wisdom
of that.4
It was also fear that lay at the heart of the infamous Palmer Raids,
the government's answer to a series of bombings that terrorized the
country in 1919, including a mail bomb sent to Supreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes and another that detonated outside the home
of then Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer.5 The nation's answer
included a hasty piece of legislation that authorized the nationwide
round-up of 6000 foreign nationals; individuals who were arrested not
on suspicion of involvement in the terrorist bombings, but on charges
of associating with the Communist Party and the Communist Labor
Party.6 This was a blunt approach, and one that promised to sweep up
far more individuals

not

connected to the bombing spree than to it. It

was an answer calibrated to the heightened level of the nation's fear,
not the reality of the threat.

1. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1943).
2. For excellent discussions of the detention program, see Robert Justin Goldstein,

An

American Gulag? Summary Arrest and Emergency Detention of Political Dissidents in the
United States, 10 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 541, 558-61 (1978), and Eric L. Muller,
Inference or Impact? Racial Profiling and the Internment's True Legacy, 1 OHI O ST. J. CRIM.

L. 103, 109 (2003).
3.

See

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

4. Take the apology of President Reagan to the Japanese American community. Julie
Johnson, President Signs Law to Redress Wartime Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1988, at A16.
5. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism:
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16 (2003).
6.

See

Repeating History in the War on Terrorism,

David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STA N. L. REV. 953, 996-98 (2002).
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In his book Defending Mohammad: Justice on Trial, Robert E.
Precht7 worries a lot about fear - specifically, how fear might have
"doomed" his client Mohammad Salameh's chance for a fair trial in

1993

when Salameh, an illegal Palestinian immigrant, was charged

along with three others (Nidal Ayyad, Mahmoud Abouhalima and
Ahmad Ajaj)8 with planning and carrying out the first bombing of the
World Trade Center (pp.

17-18).

By any standard, the first bombing

was a crime of intense national interest, and if Salameh's lawyer had
any doubt about that, he was disabused of it when, following his first
appearance as Mohammad's counsel, reporters literally pinned him
against one of the stone pillars outside the Manhattan federal
courthouse and peppered him with questions (p. 7). The bombing left
six dead, injured more than one thousand others, and destroyed
hundreds of millions of dollars in property (p.

64).

Thus public calls

for an aggressive investigative response in the wake of the attack were
hardly surprising, and they were voiced well before the last body was
discovered and removed from the debris (p. ix). The throngs of
reporters who packed the courtroom throughout the trial were
testament to the great interest in both the crime and the four
defendants charged with involvement in it.
Robert Precht and I did know each other, but we were not friends,
when he tried the case that is the subject of his memoir,

Mohammad.

Defending

Indeed, at the time, there was little chance that Precht

and I would have seen eye-to-eye about much about the case,
including the rightness of the accusations, the fair-mindedness of the
prosecutors assigned to the case, and the manner in which United
States District Court Judge Kevin Duffy presided over the trial.9 For
in

1993,

when Precht, an experienced Legal Services attorney working

for the elite federal-defenders unit in Manhattan, found himself
assigned to defend Mohammad Salameh (p.

3),

I worked directly

across the street as a federal prosecutor in the U.S. Attorneys Office
for the Southern District of New York, the office responsible for
Mohammad's prosecution. I was not involved in Mohammad
Salameh's case, but I knew and admired the prosecutors who were. So
I am quite sure that at the time of the trial neither Precht nor I would
have predicted that, some ten years later, the editors of the

Michigan

7. Assistant Dean of Public Service, Michigan Law School.
8. A fifth suspect, and the alleged mastermind of the bombing plot, was Ramzi Yousef,
a fugitive believed to be hiding out throughout the trial in Iraq. See p. 18.
9. We still disagree about much relating to the way in which the trial was conducted. But
my conversations with Precht since, and my own writing about legal and social developments
after 9/11, see Sharon L. Davies, Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45 (2003), convince
me that we share many concerns about the future of terrorism investigations and
prosecutions.
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Law Review would ask me to review the book that he would write
about experiences as Mohammad's attorney.
But life is filled with wondrous Jungian synchronicities and
unexpected surprises.

I.

THETRIAL

One need not have been involved in the 1993 case to have a more
nuanced perspective today on the significance of the first bombing of
the World Trade Center. For one, as Precht explains so well in his
book, the failure of the perpetrators of the first bombing to bring the
tower down created for many a false confidence in the indestructibility
of the imposing structures, a confidence that continued to their
collapse on September 11, 2001. Although it was apparent at the time
of the 1993 bombing that the perpetrators could have inflicted far
worse damage and loss of life had the buildings been less resistant to
attack, those familiar with the North Tower were not surprised that it
withstood the explosion. After all, the towers had been well built; they
had been designed by folks who knew enough about the unpredictable
nature of human conduct to consider in advance the possibility that a
plane, even a fully fueled 707 aircraft, might be flown into one of them
one day.10 The towers could withstand such an assault, its designers
predicted, and the 1993 bombing seemed simply to prove the point.
We know now, of course, that the buildings were not impervious.
And, as a result, the "if onlys" that linger in the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks on the towers are likely to haunt us forever. "If only" we had
realized that the towers were more vulnerable than we thought they
were. "If only" we could have predicted that as icons they would be
too tempting a target ever to be safe from additional terrorist attacks.11
And perhaps, "if only" we had considered more carefully the
significance of Mohammad Salameh's and his co-defendants' defiant
cries of protest and anger when the jury pronounced its verdicts of
guilt upon each of them: "Victory to Islam!" "Injustice people!" "God
is great!" "Cheap people, cheap government!" (p. 162).
It is tempting to respond to such defiance and remorselessness with
a defiance of one's own. To assuage our own lingering fears about

10. Seep. 73 (referring to structural-engineer Leslie Robertson's testimony that the tow
ers had been built to withstand the impact of "the largest jet aircraft in the air at the time").
11. During his opening remarks at Mohammad Salameh's trial, the federal prosecutor
predicted that "February 26, 1993, would become a day that would mark for all time the
single most destructive act of terrorism ever committed here in the United States." P. 61.
Would that he had been right. But Timothy McVeigh's bombing of the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, resulting in the deaths of 168 innocents, would
soon eclipse the destructiveness of the first bombing of the World Trade Center. The loss of
nearly 3000 lives from the September 11, 2001 attacks would prove the prosecutor wrong
yet again.
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those who would do us such grievous harm with a lack of concern
about the rights and treatment of those who fall (or even just might
fall) within that group of enemies. It is tempting to get a machine gun.
Such is the thought-bending power of fear. Rob Precht's powerful
retelling of his experiences defending one in this group of enemies,
however, invites us to reach for a more deliberative response. For
what we do to our enemies says much not only about the principles
against which we would measure ourselves, but the steel of our very
belief, or lack of belief, in our own system of justice.
A. Remembrances of a Defense Attorney
Defending Mohammad is a fast-moving read, dotted with frequent,
highly moving descriptions of the complex, often-emotional
relationship between an accused and his counsel. The author has a
knack for capturing the grey in human relationships, and his best
success at this is when he invites his readers into the exchanges that
occurred between him and his young client over the course of twelve
months after he accepted the assignment to serve as Salameh's counsel
(p. 3), found himself in the heady vortex of what would surely be the
most high profile case of his life, and thereafter struggled to keep his
high profile client happy while attending to his legal defense.
On a technical level, the book provides an excellent descriptive
account of the various phases of a federal criminal trial. Precht
explains the stages of the trial and pretrial process in a clear, coherent,
and accessible way, making the text as accessible to the lay reader as it
is to the legally-trained. The order of the account is, unsurprisingly
chronological, beginning with a vivid recollection of the day when,
shortly after the bombing, Precht received a late-afternoon call from
prosecutor Henry DePippo asking him to come to the ceremonial
courtroom to represent "the bomber" (pp. 2-3).
Even from this early moment, the reader feels the weightiness of
the terrorism charge and discerns the uniqueness of this client.
Precht's description of his hurried first meeting with Salameh just
before a hearing was held to determine the question of bail puts on
self-conscious display the author's own cultural biases, challenging us
to examine our own. "I expected to encounter a wild-eyed zealot," he
writes (p. 3). "But the man sitting on the bench who looked up at me
appeared quite ordinary. Mohammad Salameh was small, thin, in his
mid-twenties, with a closely cropped beard, large nose, and brown
eyes. He looked utterly defeated."12 After this introduction to

12. P. 3. Precht confronts his cultural biases at a number of places in the book. For
example, he describes his discomfort with Hassen Abdellah, the attorney for Mahmud
Abouhalima, one of Salameh's co-defendants. Unlike Precht, Abdellah was able to speak
with Mohammad and the other defendants in Arabic. Abdellah also tended to end strategy

Justice in the Time of Terror

May 2004]

1135

Salameh, the book moves quickly, providing a rare opportunity to
witness the development of the oddly mutually-dependent relationship
that can develop between a suddenly infamous criminal defendant and
the attorney who is left (because the client is in jail) as the accused's
only public spokesperson.
More fundamentally, the book raises serious questions about the
rightness of arguments currently in vogue which would subject future
terrorism suspects to expanded police powers during criminal
investigations, while denying them the procedural protections to which
they would normally be entitled after formal charges are lodged. The
sections that follow immediately below provide an analysis of some of
the memoir's many strengths. Part II then considers the book's more
fundamental warning that, in moments of grave national insecurity,
legislative and judicial officials tend to discount the value of civil
liberties and procedural protections and overestimate the value of
expanded police authority.
1.

Defense of the Possibly Guilty

By the end of Defending Mohammad one feels that she has a much
firmer understanding of how difficult it is to represent a client whom
the country suspects is guilty and as a result is intent to loathe, and yet
how electrifying it is to be the attorney at the center of a case as to
which the public has a seemingly unsatiable interest.13 A particularly
poignant example of one of the challenges is supplied by the author's
recollection of a late-night confrontation on a Manhattan subway with
a man who recognized Precht from one of his many televised
interviews on Salameh's behalf. The man asked Precht accusingly how
he would feel if he succeeded in getting Salameh and his co
defendants acquitted, and then they did it again?14 The author wisely

meetings involving the four defendants and their counsel by invoking Allah. Precht wrote
about the experience:
Islam still seemed like an impossibly remote and alien religion to me. I had grown up in
Scarsdale, New York, my maternal grandmother was Jewish, and most of my friends were
Jewish. In high school, I watched news clips of airliners blown up in the desert by Muslim
fanatics. . . . (M]y views of the religion were not positive.
P. 56. In fact, Precht admits that Mohammad Salameh was the first Muslim "[he] had ever
had an extended conversation with, and the circumstances of [their] coming together were
hardly conducive to dispelling [liis] negative impressions of the religion." Pp. 56-57.
13. Precht writes: "I had to admit that the allure of publicity was intoxicating. I told
myself I was making statements to the media to protect my client's interests, but I also
enjoyed the limelight." P. 23.
14. The subway encounter occurred after Precht had given "hundreds of interviews to
television, radio, and newspaper reporters" in connection with Salameh's defense, including
appearances on the Larry King Show, ABC's Good Morning America, CBS's Morning
Show, and NBC's Today Show. P. 12. Stepping closer to Precht, the middle-aged subway
rider asked:

1 136

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 102:1130

attempts to provide a fuller answer to his readers than the perfunctory
one he offered to his subway interrogator. He reminds us of similar
unpopular defenses taken on by such notables as John Adams (when
he defended British soldiers who fought at the Boston Massacre) and
Edward Bennett Williams (who represented Joseph McCarthy against
censure by fellow senators), who were branded "traitor" (Adams) or
"fascist" (Williams) for their efforts and lost many clients and
supporters in the process (p. 77).
This history lesson is fair as far as it goes, though it is impossible
not to wonder why the author skips over more recent examples, like
Johnnie Cochran, and his defense of O.J. Simpson. I suspect that it is
because when answering a question as important as this - how can an
attorney defend a client whom she personally thinks might be guilty?
- one instinctively feels the need to be in the company of "great
ones" who have made like choices in the past.15 But such grand
company provides an unneeded shield. For even had Rob Precht no
famed predecessors with whom he could join company, even had he
been the very first to have got up the courage to come to the defense
of a publicly unpopular defendant charged with a heinous or hated
crime, he would have been right to do it. Our adversarial system of
criminal justice depends on lawyers demanding that it live up to its
rules. Rules that, among other things, require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and place the burden of proof on the shoulders of
the party advancing the accusation of wrongdoing. As Precht explains,
"Vigorous advocacy on behalf of every defendant, guilty or
innocent . . . serves to further 'society's determination to keep
unsoiled and beyond suspicion the procedures by which men are
condemned for a violation of its laws.' "16

"How are you going to feel?"
"I beg your pardon?"
"How are you going to feel when you get them off?"
"I don't know that's going to happen."
"They're going to do it again. You know that, don't you? How are you going to feel?"
"Look, sir, it's not for me to judge the defendants, it's the jury's job. I'm just trying to make
sure my client gets a fair trial."
"How do you feel about the pregnant lady who got killed? How do you feel tricking
people?"
I decided to get off at the next station, before my regular stop and rose from my seat. The
subway pulled into the station. The doors opened. I walked out.
From behind, I heard him shout. "This is just a game for you!"
Pp.

76-77.

15. As talented an attorney as
and Williams.

Cochran may be,

he has yet to rise to the level of Adams

16. P. 78 (quoting Lon Fuller,
37 (Harold J. Berman ed., 1961)).

The Adversary System, in TALKS

ON AMERICAN LAW 30,
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Fame

With fame for the client comes fame for the lawyer, and as Precht
describes so well in his memoir, such fame can be very seductive stuff.
The media attention devoted to the 1993 bombing prosecution was
fierce and unyielding, and all who played a part in the case
experienced its intensity and the fame that accompanied it in very
personal ways.17 For Precht, the attention was both exhilarating and
addictive. "The case was a great break for my career," Precht recalls
with refreshing honesty in his book, "I now had a public stage on
which to act out my fantasies of being a Super Lawyer."18 Thus, when
Judge Duffy, at the first pretrial conference, imposed a gag order on
all of the attorneys in the case, forbidding any further statements to
the press, Precht fought back with the determination of an addict
looking for his next fix. Brushing aside his boss's advice that the gag
order might just be "a blessing in disguise" (p. 21), Precht successfully
appealed the issue to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, which lifted the gag order and issued a "sharply
worded" reminder to the trial judge that such restrictions on attorneys
were extreme measures to be imposed only upon a showing that
permitting statements to be made to the press would make the
possibility of a fair trial substantial unlikely, and a showing that the
trial court had considered less extreme measures before imposing it.19
A stern rebuke.
As a matter of law, Precht was precisely right about the gag order,
and he had the reversal order to prove it. As a matter of trial strategy,
however, the reader is entitled to wonder (even before the author
recounted what happened next) whether this would turn out to be a
Pyrrhic victory. There were at least two reasons to fear that it would.
First, Precht was himself concerned about the effect that the heavy
publicity surrounding the case would have on the jury that was picked
to decide the case. Thus the author asks much of his readers when
later in the book he complains about that publicity and worries that it
jeopardized his client's chance for a fair trial.20 It is difficult to be
17. For Gil Childers, the lead prosecutor in the case, the extremely intense interest in
the case resulted in fear for his and his family's safety. Gil received death threats while
prosecuting the case. This was a rare occurrence for fe deral prosecutors, and thus I and the
rest of the Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the office were made aware of it.
18. P. 15. Hand in hand with the thrill of such newfound fame went the fear of losing it.
The author recounts, for example, being fearful that Salameh would decide to fire him and
hire someone else. See p. 15 ("I was like an insecure lover, and when Mohammad did not
telephone me as he usually did, I became anxious.").
19. See pp. 22-23; United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 446 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1038 (1991)).
20. See p. 57 (arguing that "the jury selection process was not maximized to reveal
whether jurors had been negatively influenced by the wealth of pretrial publicity," and
complaining that leading questions asked by a judge whom the prospective jurors seemed to
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sympathetic when the defense itself carried at least some of the
responsibility for that publicity by making a conscious decision to use
the media as a part of its strategy.21 Indeed, the trial court delighted in
reminding Precht about the cost of having its gag order vacated when
it denied his pretrial motion for a change of venue.22
Nevertheless, to be fair, had Precht submitted to the gag order,
there seems little reason to believe that the media's interest in the case
would have subsided. In such a case, even if the prosecutors refused to
pass along information to satisfy that hunger (and I believe they would
have refused) there was no assurance that an agent or other person
knowledgeable about the government's case would have been equally
circumspect. If information advantageous to the prosecution
continued to leak, as Precht feared it would, he truly would have been
between a rock and a hard place, having been ordered not to talk by
the judge and thus having no way to defend his client in the court of
public opinion.
An additional, and more pragmatic, reason counseled against
seeking an appeal of the gag order - the judge who had made that
order was slated to preside over the trial, and having him reversed
before the trial was hardly likely to endear the lawyer to him. That
Rob Precht was willing to press on with the appeal is a credit to his
courage and commitment to his client, for this judge in particular was
not known for pulling his punches when angered.23

look up to and wanted to please were not apt to ferret out those whose views had been
tainted by the heavy publicity that preceded the trial).
p. 12 (noting that Precht's boss, Leonard Joy, booked him on the Larry King
so that he could respond to the information being given to the media by federal
authorities).
21. See

Show

22. The motion was based on the ground that no New York City jury would be able to
ignore the publicity that had been leaked to the press before the trial and decide the case
impartially. Judge Duffy was unsympathetic:
Counsel for Salameh points a finger at the Government for this state of affairs. The fault, as
counsel knows full well, however, does not lie with the Government. This court attempted to
prevent the dissemination of prejudicial publicity by imposing a "gag order" upon the
attorneys and their agents at the time the matter initially came before me. Counsel for
Salameh strenuously objected to this order, and successfully had it vacated by the Court of
Appeals. In effect, counsel is really complaining that he was unable to "control" the
publicity.

P. 46.
23. The book details a number of incidents after the gag-order reversal hinting that
Precht's decision to appeal may have soured the judge's view of the lawyer permanently.
The Judge referred to the lawyer as "Bobby" rather than Rob, for example, when
introducing him to prospective jurors during jury selection, see p. 47, a slight that seemed
intentionally designed to belittle the attorney. The venom in the trial court's rejection of the
defendant's motion for a change of venue specifically referenced Precht's decision to appeal
the gag order is another example. See p. 46.

Justice in the Time of Terror
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Second Thoughts

Second guessing one's strategic calls is inevitable, whether one is
on the defense or prosecutorial side, and Rob Precht is no exception.
For example, he wonders out loud in his book whether he should have
filed a motion to recuse Judge Duffy after the judge tipped his hand
and revealed that he had been privy to information that Salameh's co
defendants had at some point admitted their roles in the conspiracy and had pointed the finger at Salameh as well.24 Judge Duffy told
Precht that due to that information he was fairly sure that Salameh
was in fact guilty, and this caused the experienced federal defender to
conclude in his book that the judge could not be fair to his client.
I am not sure. Certainly no one familiar with Judge Duffy would
consider him a soft touch, but there is little in Precht's account of the
trial to indicate that the judge treated Salameh unfairly (although he
was certainly not gentle with Precht) (p. 54). To the contrary, the
judge seemed to exercise real patience with Salameh. For example,
when Salameh refused one day to come to court until the judge held a
private session with him to talk about his complaints about his prison
conditions, Judge Duffy held that meeting with the defendant, and
Precht himself depicts the judge's response during the meeting as
"patient[]," attentive, and polite. It is true that several motions were
decided against the defense, including a motion for a change of
venue,25 a motion to reveal the identify of an unindicted co
conspirator,26 and a motion for a mistrial after the federal prosecutor
remarked in his opening statement that, after the explosion, the nation
understood in a new way that terrorism was no longer a problem for
the rest of the world, but could happen to us here.27 But there is no
reason to think that those motions would (or should) have been
decided any other way by any other judge in the courthouse. In this
respect, the reader may find Precht's understanding of the pressures
on prosecutorial team28 and the trial judge29 less nuanced than his fine

24. He worries similarly about his cross-examination choices, but here seems as willing
to second guess the examinations conducted by his co-counsel as his own. Precht adds to this
additional, engaging descriptions of missteps of his co-defense counsel and the prosecutor.
See chapter 10. This is high drama, and grist for the mill of every evidence professor who
teaches her students not to ask open-ended "why" questions on cross-examination.
25.

See pp.

26.

See pp. 24-30.

44-46.

27. See p. 64. Defense counsel argued that the opening went beyond the charges in the
indictment, and essentially pitted a group of "foreign alien defendants" against "We the
Americans" in the first chapter of "a war of terrorism on the United States." P. 64.
28. But now and then even the prosecutor is humanized. Gil is described in a fairly
complimentary way at various points. See pp. 46-47, 159-60.
29. For example, as is the custom in every federal courtroom, the judge's entry is
preceded by that of a clerk who announces the judge's arrival with a commanding "All
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depictions of the interactions with his client and the year-long
development of their relationship. If so, this is a weakness that can be
forgiven, for it is evident throughout the narrative that what the
author is really retelling here is the defense's experience of the trial.
The insider view that this account provides itself makes the book well
worth the read.
4.

The Unbearable Lightness of a Defense

Another of the book's real strengths is the way in which the author
conveys the difficulties counsel face when deciding upon the best
defense strategy, a difficulty that in this case was exacerbated by
several factors, including: the limited access Precht had to his
incarcerated client (p. 40), the cultural gulf that continued to torment
the two men throughout the course of the representation,30 the
tensions and conflicts that arise when multiple defendants who are
tried together choose different lines of attack on the prosecution's
evidence (pp. 43-44), and the sheer volume of that evidence.
As to the evidence, conviction of the four defendants accused of
involvement in the 1993 Trade Center bombing was by no means a
lock. As pointed out in the book, the prosecution's case was entirely
circumstantial (p. 156). There were no eye witnesses to the bombing
and no one to identify the person who drove the bomb-carrying van
into the garage below the tower on the day of the attack. The prompt
arrest and conviction of all four defendants then, is creditable to the
abilities of the prosecutorial and investigative team of individuals who
weaved together a mass of evidence that linked the defendants to each
other, the chemicals that were used to make the bomb, the storage
locker in which those chemicals were kept for a time, the apartment in
which the bomb was constructed, and the van that was used to
transport it to the site of the explosion. The fact that the prosecution
was able to do this also shows that, contrary to popular belief, the lack
of direct evidence is hardly fatal to a criminal case. Indeed, quite
often, the multi-layered process of drawing connections between those
standing accused of working together to commit a crime, of linking
them to the ingredients that made the crime possible, as well as the
location at which it occurred, can be more convincing than a case
based on direct identification evidence.

Rise!" But unlike the other judges in the Manhattan courthouse, Judge Duffy "walked into
the courtroom . . . telling people to 'sit down, sit down' as soon as he got through the door
and well before he actually reached the bench." P. 59. Unlike Precht, who thought this all an
act, a pretense of disdain for the normal rituals of respect owing a federal judge, I found this
a genuine reflection of the judge's lack of regard for pomp and circumstance.
30. See 116 (relating how Salameh told his lawyer that the lawyer would never
understand him).
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Such circumstantial proof, if it holds together, often severely limits
the trial strategies available to defense counsel. In this case, for
example, the prosecutors alleged that Mohammad Salameh's role in
the offense included opening a joint bank account with co-defendant
Ayyad into which funds were deposited to finance the making of the
bomb (p. 62). Other evidence showed that money from that account
was used to rent a storage shed in Jersey City, New Jersey (pp. 62-63).
Still more proof established: the presence of chemicals in that shed,
which were consistent with the chemicals in the bomb that went off in
the World Trade Center tower; that Salameh helped to find and rent
the apartment in which those chemicals were fashioned into a bomb;
that the co-defendants were in frequent telephone contact with each
other throughout the period of the bomb plot; that Mohammad rented
the Ryder van which would be shown to have contained the
homemade bomb; that an anonymous letter to the New York Times
taking credit for the bombing could be linked to Mohammad's co
conspirator, Ayyad; that his other co-defendants Yousef, Abouhalima
and Yasin fled the country immediately after the bombing occurred;
and that Salameh would have done the same had he not been arrested
first (p. 64).
To be sure, a jury might find some or even all of these pieces of
evidence unconvincing when tested against the beyond-a-reasonable
doubt standard. But if pretrial discovery of the prosecution's proof
could convince defense counsel that the allegations likely could be
proved, a wide array of otherwise possible defenses would disappear
as quickly as did the walls and other supports of the World Trade
Center garage. Put slightly differently, if the prosecution could prove
that co-defendants Nidal Ayyad and Mohammad Salameh had in fact
opened a joint account together, out of which funds were used to rent
a storage facility in which bomb-making chemicals were stored, at
minimum a juror would likely want to know the innocent explanation
for that account and the innocent purpose for the storage-facility
rental. Certainly that proof would make it impossible to claim that the
government's case was simply one of mistaken identity (i.e., that the
bank account belonged to another, or that the person who rented the
storage facility or apartment or van was someone else). Further, if the
evidence of the association between these defendants effectively tied
them to these instrumentalities of the crime, the defense would be left
with little to argue but that the accused lacked knowledge of the
purpose for which the money or van were to be used. And after
reviewing the government's discovery, this was precisely the
conclusion Rob Precht reached on behalf of his client prior to the start
of the trial - his best defense was lack of knowledge of the bomb
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plot.31 This meant that if Mohammad Salameh was to be acquitted it
would be because his able lawyer had succeeded in convincing the jury
that, at minimum, there was reason to doubt that Salameh knew what
his acquaintances had been up to. His client, Precht would argue, had
been duped.32
As with other decisions, in his reminiscences about the trial the
author spends a considerable amount of time second guessing this
defense strategy, as well as his decision to sum up the case in the way
that he did, a summation that resulted in his client sending a letter to
the judge in complaint (p. 147). In the summation as at trial, Precht
stressed his "dupe" theory, arguing that even if the government's
proof established his client's association with the other defendants, it
did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that Salameh knew what the
others were up to prior to the bombing (p. 140). This line of argument
angered the other defendants who preferred to keep a unified front
and would have had Precht argue simply that the government's
evidence failed to stand up to scrutiny.33 The problem was (as the
verdicts later showed) the government's evidence did stand up to
scrutiny, as Precht suspected it would.34 Thus, however unpopular, he
cannot fairly be faulted for choosing his "dupe" approach over that
preferred by the other attorneys at the defense table.
Rob Precht does not concede in his book that the similar tact that
he took in summation was in fact at odds with Salameh's wishes (pp.
146, 149), despite his client's letter to the judge suggesting that it was
(pp. 146, 149), and a telephone interview that Salameh gave to a
reporter from Reuters the day after the summation during which
Salameh criticized his attorney for conceding there had been a
conspiracy to bomb the Trade Center and maintaining that the
mastermind of that conspiracy had duped him (p. 147). Precht
maintains that he agreed to both press the dupe theory35 and attack

31. The author recalled in the book, "I did not attempt to challenge the physical
evidence, and I tacitly accepted the government's proof that Mohammad had rented the
storage locker, the house, and the van that carried the bomb. But I maintained that he
truthfully reported the van stolen hours before the explosion." P. 65.
32. For the other defendants who were not as easily connected to the funds and storage
locker and van used in the bombing plot, there were other defenses available. One argued
that the prosecution was merely seeking a scapegoat for the explosion, "pandering to the
jury's patriotic sympathies" and building its case on "rhetoric" rather than facts. See p. 66.
Another pointed out that it was impossible for his client to have been involved, as he was in
jail at the time the explosion occurred. Seep. 66.
33. One of the defense attorneys was so upset that he moved for a mistrial on the
ground that Precht had done "more damage to [his client] in the first six minutes or so of his
summation than [the prosecutor] did in the six hours of his summation." P. 143.
34. Seep. 134 ("[T]he volume of evidence against Mohammad was truly staggering.").
35. See pp. 135-37 (recounting part of the summation where Precht argued Salameh was
manipulated by Ramzi Yousef, a fugitive in Iraq at the time of the trial).
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the strength of the prosecution's proof.36 At the last minute, however,
the lawyer decided to hit hardest the idea that the evidence was
insufficient to show that Salameh knew the true purpose to which the
storage locker he rented, the apartment he secured, and the van he
leased would be put.37 And it was this call that earned Precht the ire of
both his client and his fellow defense attorneys.
As to which was the better defense for his client, Precht's judgment
was clearly the wiser call.38 But his decision to emphasize that
argument over Salameh's preferred attack raises an interesting
question about the ethical obligations of a defense attorney who fears
that his client's strategic preferences will lead to sure conviction.
Against heavy criticism that the client, not the attorney, must be left to
make such calls, Precht defends his contrary view as follows:
I do not believe that a defendant can or should dictate tactics.... ABA

model rule 1.2(a) says that a lawyer is required to abide by the client's
decisions concerning the "objectives of representation." To me that
means that a lawyer must abide by a client's decision whether to go to
trial to contest the charges, to plead guilty to avoid a long prison term, to
cooperate with government authorities, and the like. Beyond that, it is
the lawyer's call as to how best to achieve these objectives. The lawyer
should consult with the client, but the lawyer has the final say as to
tactics. (p. 150)

Precht is right. It is certainly true that the client has the ultimate
authority to determine the objectives of litigation at least within legal
limits, and once set, an attorney has a professional obligation to abide
by her client's directives in that regard.39 Nevertheless, the means by
which an attorney seeks to achieve those objectives are largely within
her discretion.40 Thus, while the client has the plain authority to make
such a decision as whether to testify at trial, to accept a plea offer, to
plead guilty, and to waive his right to a jury trial,41 in the famous words

36. See pp. 137-38 (recounting the part of the summation where Precht challenged the
proof connecting Salameh to the storage locker rental application, pointed out that the
person who took a cash deposit on the apartment
- from Salameh had not actually seen him
move into the apartment, etc.).
37. The author himself acknowledges this. See p. 149 ("I certainly did not think revers
ing the order of the arguments and shortening my attack on the physical evidence when the
jury started to lose interest was a major departure from the strategy we had agreed on.").
38. When the attorney for one of the other defendants moved for a mistrial based on
Precht's summation, the j udge denied the request and stated, to the contrary, that the
summation "may have been Mr. Salameh's best chance." P. 144.
39.

See MODEL RULES OF

PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1 .2(a) (1983).

40. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101.B (1980); see
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-5.2 (1993).
41.

See Wainwright

v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977).

also

ABA,
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of one trial lawyer, the attorney is "not a potted plant."42 Determining
the trial or appellate strategy that is most likely to achieve the client's
stated objectives is a decision left largely to the attorney.43 And, absent
a strong showing of ineffective representation, the lawyer cannot be
faulted simply because her strategic decisions were unable to win
the day.
II.

DEFENDING THE MOHAMMADS OF THE FUTURE

As this Part shows, Defending Mohammad delivers an engaging
and informative account of the trial of the four individuals convicted
of carrying out the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center from the
perspective of an attorney assigned to defend the case. The book
reminds us that every criminal trial is an unfolding human drama, and
advances the reader's understanding of the way in which our system of
justice strove, even if imperfectly, to deliver justice in a single case.
But it also does more than that. The book's deeper contribution is the
questions it raises about the nation's future responses to terrorist
threats. What made the 1993 crime so significant, the author reminds
us, was the sense of vulnerability that lingered in the explosion's wake
and the impact such vulnerability can have on our commitments to our
own justice system and the rules that govern official investigations. As
Precht puts it, "On trial were not simply the defendants' deeds, but the
threat of terrorism" (p. 61). He thus pauses toward the end of the
book to consider the future of terrorism investigations and
prosecutions, and the nation's tendency in times of widespread
national fear and insecurity to submit perhaps too easily to reductions
in rights and liberties. The author points to two ways in which this
erosion of liberties had begun to happen in the wake of the 9/11
attacks: 1) through acquiescence to the use of torture on terrorism
suspects;44 and 2) by increased reliance on military tribunals.45
42. Comment of attorney Brendan Sullivan while defending Oliver North at the Iran
Contra hearings.
43.

See, e.g.,

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983).

44. Although the government has yet to state that it has used torture as a tool in its "war
on terror," a number of scholars have argued that it could. See, e.g., Oren Gross, The
Prohibition on Torture and the Limits of the Law, in TORTURE (Sanford Levinson ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press, f orthcoming in 2004). Arguments on various grounds that torture may
be acceptable in some circumstances are not new. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL
QUESTIONS 56 (1979) (arguing that when special conditions exist "it may become impossible
to adhere to an absolutist position"); Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23
ISR. L. REV. 280 (1989).
45. In November 2001, President Bush issued a military order that dispensed with
criminal trials and authorized the trial of aliens accused of terrorist acts or harboring
terrorists before military tribunals. Such trials could be held in secret and be based on
classified information as to which the accused would have no right of access; the normal
rules of evidence would not apply; there would be no jury right, conviction could be had
upon 2/3 agreement of the military officers who presided over the proceeding; there was no
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Precht's account of the 1993 trial can help the reader assess for
herself the necessity for such measures, including in particular the
necessity of an extra-civilian court system for the adjudication of
future terrorism cases.46 If anything, the successful prosecution of
Mohammad Salameh and his co-defendants suggests that the criminal
justice system was well-enough equipped in 1993 to apprehend such
wrongdoers and to bring them swiftly to justice. Thus one is entitled to
question whether dramatic modification of our rules and system are
truly needed to redress future acts of terror. Although clearly
concerned about the fairness of the judicial process afforded
Mohammad Salameh, Rob Precht's belief in the ability of the civilian
judicial system to ensure a fair trial to individuals charged with
terrorist acts remained largely unshaken after defending the case. He
writes toward the end of his book:
It especially seems premature to give up on the criminal justice system
when there is no evidence that the system is unable to handle terrorism
cases. The 1993 Trade Center trial was swift, and it did not disclose
government secrets.While I believe the trial was unfair, the fault was not
that the system lacked safeguards.Rather, the participants failed to use
them. Jury trials are not perfect. .. . Nevertheless, the jury trial system is
premised on the idea of impartiality, a concept alien to military tribunals,
which lack any safeguards for insuring it.... The best weapon we have
against terrorist is not our passions. It is the rule of law. (p.169)

I would add to Precht's list of reflections about the future of
terrorism investigations one other concern that, to date, has received
far less scholarly attention than those the author raises in his memoir:
the weakening of federal constitutional restrictions on police power to
detain and gather evidence from groups of people without having to
satisfy the "reasonable suspicion" standard.47 In the space that remains
here, I will focus on that concern, and the way in which the U.S.
Supreme Court's recent decisions in Illinois v. Lidster48 and United
States v. Flores-Montano49 make this an additional topic of concern.

right of appeal and the penalty could be death. See A copy of the Military Order issued on
Nov. 13, 2001 can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/ll/2001111327.html.
46. I have written elsewhere about a third area in which the public seems willing to
demand less of its government officials in a time of terror - by permitting (if not
encouraging) ethnic profiling. See Davies, supra note 9, at 45; see also William J. Stuntz,
Local Policing after the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137 (2002); Samuel R. Gross & Debra
Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002); Muller, supra
note 2.
47. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (establishing the reasonable-suspicion
standard as the justification demanded by the Fourth Amendment to conduct a temporary
seizure of an individual).
48. 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004).
49. 124 S. Ct. 1582 (2004).
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For although the facts of Lidster and Flores-Montano involve no acts
of terrorism, the Justices' unanimous agreement that suspicionless
group seizures (Lidster) and searches (Flores-Montano) are in some
circumstances constitutionally defensible can be understood, I think,
only in an age of terror, and we would be wise carefully to consider the
implications of such broadened police power.
In my earlier article, Profiling Terror,50 I challenged arguments
advanced by a number of prominent criminal-procedure scholars after
the 9/11 attacks defending more-liberal profiling practices targeting
Arabs and Muslims in terrorism investigations. Harvard Law
Professor William Stuntz was among those scholars, and he argued
(quite presciently as it turns out) that, as is true after any crime wave,
after 9/11 it was inevitable that both legislative and judicial steps
would be taken to trim individual rights and expand police powers.51
This was not a development to be avoided, Professor Stuntz argued
further. To the contrary, the police should be given more robust
authority to seize and search groups of individuals without
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. Civil libertarians should
concern themselves not with the fact that the police were permitted to
do so more easily,52 but with the manner in which those police-citizen
contacts occurred.53 If this new authority was conferred upon the
police, as Professor Stuntz thought it should be, it would result in
(among other things) expanded police power to set up highway
checkpoints in traditional criminal-investigative settings, and
expanded power to conduct searches of individuals and their property
without the necessity of a showing of exceptional need or
individualized suspicion.54 And the best restriction on such
suspicionless searches and seizures, Professor Stuntz argued, would be
ex post judicial review of the manner in which the encounters
occurred.
At the time Professor Stuntz made this argument, the prospect that
a police right to conduct suspicionless group searches and seizures
would materialize seemed fairly remote, even to those most fearful
that individual rights and liberties were being trimmed and

50.

See Davies, supra

51.

See

52

See id.

note 9.

Stuntz, supra note 46, at 2142-60.
at 2163.

53. See id. at 2173. Stuntz argues that the line between valid and invalid police intrusions
should be changed from the (then) sharp focus separating seizures/non-seizures and
searches/non-searches to a "hazier" line separating "decent" from "indecent" police
behavior. Id. at 2174 ("Worrying about how street stops happen makes more sense than
worrying about how many of them happen.") (emphasis added).
54.

See id.

at 2164-65.
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investigative authority broadened in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.55
After all, the Supreme Court had considered and rejected the
constitutionality of a highway checkpoint only a year before those
attacks, where the primary purpose of the roadblock was to discover
and interdict illegal narcotics. In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,56 the
Court reminded the nation's police forces that a "search or seizure is
ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing."57 Thus, the drug checkpoint was unconstitutional
because its primary purpose was "to advance 'the general interest in
crime control' "58 rather than to address the special and challenging
"problems of policing the border"59 or "the necessity of ensuring
roadway safety,"60 or some other limited administrative or "special
need."61 "We have never approved a checkpoint program whose
primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing," wrote Justice O'Connor for the Edmond majority, for
fear that any such holding would allow such intrusions to become "a
routine part of American life."62
1. Suspicionless Group Seizures
Illinois v. Lidster
The
"Seeking Information " Exception to the Reasonable-Suspicion
Requirement
-

-

In light of this holding, few save perhaps Professor Stuntz would
have guessed (never mind advocated) that suspicionless stops of
groups of motorists and suspicionless searches of their vehicles would
soon be declared constitutionally permissible investigative techniques.
In January 2004, however, the Court unanimously upheld a
suspicionless roadblock in connection with a murder investigation in
Lidster, and in March 2004 it unanimously agreed that a suspicionless

55. See id. at 2164 (acknowledging that "with a fe w limited exceptions . . . the law holds
that police may not seize groups of people unless each individualized seizure is justified").
56. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
57.

Edmond,

58.

Id.

531 U.S. at 37.

at 44 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)).

59. Id. at 41; see, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (approving
suspicionless stops at a fixed border checkpoint designed to intercept undocumented aliens).
60. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41; see also Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,
447-48 (1990) (approving suspicionless stops of motorists in connection with highway
sobriety checkpoint program); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661 (approving suspicionless stops for a
spot check of motorists' licenses and vehicle registrations).
61. Sitz , 496 U.S. at 450; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
(involving random drug testing of student athletes); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602 (1989) (involving more selective drug or alcohol testing of railroad employees
who had been involved in accidents or violated a safety regulation).
62.

Edmond,

531 U.S. at 41-42.
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search of a car crossing the border into the United States violated no
Fourth Amendment norm. Neither case directly involved a terrorism
investigation, but both are best understood as examples of justice in
the time of terror.
The facts of Lidster, in brief, were these. A hit-and-run driver
struck and killed a 70-year-old bicyclist on the side of an Illinois
highway just after midnight. Approximately one week later, local
police authorities set up a highway checkpoint at the same time of
night in the same location, stopping all motorists for ten to fifteen
seconds, ostensibly to hand each motorist a flyer which requested
assistance in identifying the hit-and-run driver, and to ask each
motorist if "they had seen anything happen there the previous
weekend. "63 When Lidster's car approached the roadblock it swerved,
nearly hitting an officer, and a sobriety test revealed that he had been
drinking. He was subsequently arrested and convicted on a DUI
charge.64
Lidster appealed his conviction on the ground that the police stop
of his car without reasonable suspicion was unconstitutional under the
rule of Edmond. 65 Like the Indianapolis drug-checkpoint program, the
primary purpose of the Illinois checkpoint was to gather evidence of
"ordinary criminal wrongdoing," Lidster argued, making it violation of
his Fourth Amendment right to be free of an unreasonable seizure.
The Supreme Court disagreed. Unlike in Edmond, Justice Breyer
wrote, the Illinois police had stopped cars in the hit-and-run case "not
to determine whether a vehicle's occupants were committing a crime,
but to ask the vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for their
help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood
committed by others."66 This different type of suspicionless group stop
was thus not analogous to the kind of stop before the Edmond Court,
Justice Breyer explained, and the Fourth Amendment demanded no
" Edmond-type rule of automatic unconstitutionality." To the contrary,
such "information-seeking"67 seizures could be upheld, the Court
concluded, provided they were brief and thus "interfered only
minimally with the liberty of the sort the Fourth Amendment seeks to
protect"; the concern generating the seizures was "grave"; and the
stops were conducted "systematically" with no allegation that the

63. Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885, 888 (2004).
64. See id.

65. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
66.

Lidster,

67.

Id.

124 S. Ct. at 889 (second emphasis added).

at 889.
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police "acted in a discriminatory or otherwise unlawful manner while
questioning motorists."68
2.

The Power to Conduct Suspicionless Searches - United States v.
Flores-Montano

In Flores-Montano69 the Court extended this seizure reasoning to
border vehicle searches. The case involved a customs search of the
respondent's car as it attempted to enter the country at a port of entry
on the California-Mexico border. Customs officials found and seized
thirty-seven kilograms of marijuana in the gas tank of the car after an
inspector tapped the tank, determined that it "sounded solid," and
ordered the tank's physical removal from the undercarriage of the car,
a process that took about an hour to complete.70 Rather than argue
that the result of the tapping gave the government officials reason to
suspect the presence of narcotics in the tank, and therefore a valid
basis for investigating further,71 the government "advised the District
Court that it was not relying on reasonable suspicion" to meet Flores
Montano's motion to suppress the drugs.72 Rather, no individualized
suspicion is constitutionally required in order to remove, disassemble
and reassemble a fuel tank of a car seeking entry into the country, the
government urged. The Court unanimously agreed, in light of "the
longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and
examining persons and property crossing into this country. "73 Such
searches are reasonable per se "simply by virtue of the fact that they
occur at the border."74
Significantly, the government did not even bother to argue the
presence of individualized suspicion in these two cases, an argument
that might well have saved the stop (Lidster) and search (Flores
Montano) without breaking any new jurisprudential ground.75 Its
choice to eschew reliance on the reasonable-suspicion standard in both

68. Id. at 891 (noting also that the police "were investigating a crime that had resulted in
a human death").
69. 124

S. Ct.

70. See id.

1582 (2004).

at 1584.

71. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1996).
72 Flores-Montano, 124
73. Id.

S. Ct. at 1584-85.

at 1585 (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431

U.S. 606, 616 (1977)).

74. Id. (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S.
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473

at 616). The Flores-Montano Court later cites United
U.S. 531 , 538 (1985), for the proposition that "the
expectation of privacy is less at the border than it is in the interior." Flores-Montano, 124 S.
Ct. at 1586.
75. There is a fair argument that the police had an individualized basis in both cases,
based on Lidster's plainly impaired operation of his vehicle (his swerve), and the solid sound
of Flores-Montana's gas tank when tapped.
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cases illustrates that its true goal was to expand the authority for
government investigators. If there ever was a time to press the
argument for such an expansion, it was after 9/11. The effect of the
decisions is a further reduction in the importance of the line separating
seizures from non-seizures and searches from non-searches. Terry v.
Ohio chipped away at that line some years ago when the Court held
that a seizure, if temporary, and a search (frisk), if limited in scope,
could be justified by reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause.
Lidster and Flores-Montano go farther still, raising grave questions
about the importance of the search/seizure line of cases. At minimum,
the Fourth Amendment seems now to erect a three-tiered system,
distinguishing between full-blown searches and seizures (arrests)
which require probable cause, temporary searches and seizures (Terry
stops and frisks) which require reasonable suspicion, and other
miscellaneous searches and seizures justified by a variety of
circumstantial factors (e.g., searches at the borders, seizures of
innocents for information-seeking purposes only) which require no
individualized suspicion.
On one level it is impressive that Professor Stuntz was able to
predict that all of this would happen in the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks, and although I continue to disagree with the normative
arguments he has advanced in favor of these developments,76 I bow
to his powers of clairvoyance.77 On the other hand, perhaps one need
not be blessed with the powers of a fortune-teller to be able to
predict with fair accuracy that measures such as these are likely to
be proposed and adopted in the wake of an event that leaves the
country fearful of its safety from future threats. For never is our
confidence in our own rules and systemic procedures so easily shaken
as when (in the words of one truck driver's bumper sticker) "the going
gets tough."

76. See Davies, supra
77. As put by

note 9, at 82-93.

Professor Stuntz before

Lidster

or Flores-Montano:

What I propose here is no more than what was at stake in Edmond. The roadblock in

Edmond involved brief detentions in public, along with a few minutes of police questioning
and, sometimes, a brief search of a suspect's outer clothing and the inside of her car. These
are the usual incidents of a Terry stop and frisk. They should be within the scope of police
authority, not only when the police have reasonable suspicion of both a crime and the
presence of a weapon, but also when the people seized and searched qualify as a group.
Stuntz, supra n ot e 46, at 2168.
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CONCLUSION
To all but his lawyer and others who knew him personally,78
Mohammad Salameh quickly became a distant memory. This is not
uncommon, despite the importance of his case, for the human drama
involved in any individual case dissipates quickly once a trial court
pronounces its sentence. Indeed, it is the rare case that will reengage
the public's interest after a sentence is upheld on appeal. That Rob
Precht's Defending Mohammad is able to do so is a testament to the
author's storytelling skills and the powerful emotions that he manages
to convey when describing young Mohammad Salameh and his own
roller-coaster ride as the attorney who unexpectedly found himself in
charge of his defense.
Even more importantly, Defending Mohammad challenges us to
pause before concurring with those who claim that dramatic
reductions in liberties and rights and expansions to police power are
needed to protect against future acts of terrorism. At the bottom, such
claims are persuasive only in a time of fear. They take hold and thrive
only when the public is left so unsure of its security that it is willing to
turn a blind eye to processes that distinguish our system of justice
from all others. It is claims such as these that permit our detractors to
point to abuses such as those in Abu Ghraib as illustrating American
"justice" rather than the opposite of it.
The investigation of the 1993 bombing of the Trade Center and the
successful prosecution of those responsible for that crime is a powerful
reminder that the best answer to lawlessness is not, as some seem
currently to believe, more of the same. The best answer to lawlessness
is, and always has been, an unswerving commitment to the law,
perhaps especially when the going gets tough.

78. Judge Duffy sentenced Salameh to 240 years in prison, a sentence calculated "by
figuring the life expectancy of each of the six people killed in the bombing and subtracting
the number of years left in their lives." P. 165. The sentence was upheld on appeal. P. 165.

